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From Death to Near-Death: The Fate of Serious 
Youthful Offenders after Roper v. Simmons 
Christopher A. Mallett* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The United States juvenile death penalty was abolished in 
2005 when the Supreme Court, in Roper v. Simmons, found this 
punishment to be cruel and unusual and in violation of the 
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment.1  This decision was the final 
step in ending the death sentence for those under the age of 
eighteen.  While this sentence is no longer an option for 
retributively-inclined states, many serious youthful offenders 
continue to meet similar, and in some ways, comparably difficult 
fates.  These fates include the wholesale transfer of serious 
youthful offenders to the criminal courts2 and the subsequent 
incarceration of tens of thousands of troubled adolescents;3 and 
                                                 
*Christopher A. Mallett, Ph.D., Esq., LISW, is Associate Professor at 
Cleveland State University’s School of Social Work (c.a.mallett@csuohio.edu; 
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1 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
2 See Patrick Griffin, Nat’l. Center for Juvenile Justice, National Overviews, 
State Juvenile Justice Profiles (2003); Christopher A. Mallett, Death is Not 
Different: The Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Adult Criminal Courts, 43 
Crim. L. Bull. 523 (2007); Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Transfer of 
Juveniles to Adult Court: Effects of a Broad Policy on One Court, Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, Wash., D.C. (2007). 
3 See Richard A. Mendel, No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile 
Incarceration (2012); Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book (2011), available at 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/corrections/qa08201.asp?qaDate=2010; 
Melissa Sickmund, Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997 to 2008, Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, Wash., D.C. (2010).    
  
for a smaller subset of this group, their imprisonment for life 
without the possibility of parole (LWOP).4   
 This review of the juvenile death penalty - its history, 
impact, and extinction – does not end with the 2005 Roper 
decision.  While the abolishment of life-ending sentences for 
adolescent offenders is no longer an option for judicial officers, 
its punitive paradigm has been far-reaching, and its alternative – 
life without the possibility of parole – much more common.  This 
Article is in two-parts: 1) the analysis of the recent juvenile death 
penalty era (1976 to 2005) and federal and Supreme Court 
doctrine that eventually ended executions; and 2) post-Roper, the 
continued dismal state for serious youthful offenders, most who 
suffer from significant disabilities, trauma, and education 
deficits, with thousands sentenced to life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.  This country has shifted from the 
juvenile death penalty era to the juvenile near-death penalty era. 
 
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY: 1976 TO 2005 
 The death penalty has been used to execute adolescents in 
this country for over 300 years across varying offenses, though 
during the recent juvenile death penalty era (1976 to 2005) the 
offense had to have been first-degree or aggravated murder.5   
There had been, on average, one execution of an adolescent 
annually since the founding of this country, with twenty-two (of 
a total 226 who were sentenced to death) occurring since 1973.6   
 The death-sentencing of adolescents declined during the 
most recent three-decade era, beginning with a four-year 
moratorium declared in 1972 by the Supreme Court finding this 
sentence unconstitutional.  The Court held the death penalty (for 
                                                 
4 See Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile Lifers: Findings From a National 
Survey, The Sentencing Project, Wash., D.C. (2012). 
5 Mallett, supra note 2; Mirah A. Horowitz, Kids Who Kill: A Critique of How 
the American Legal System Deals with Juveniles Who Commit Homicide, 63 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 135 (2000).  
6 See Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and 
Executions for Juvenile Crimes (2005).   
  
juveniles and adults) to be unconstitutional due to arbitrary and 
capricious state sentencing standards.7  When the Court 
reestablished the death penalty as constitutional in 1976, it 
directed the sentencing authority to consider relevant mitigating 
circumstances to the offense and a range of factors about the 
individual defendant.8   In striking down mandatory capital 
sentencing statutes that existed prior to 1972, the Court found 
the flaw to be a failure to permit the presentation of mitigating 
circumstances: “[T]he Eighth Amendment,” explained the Court, 
“requires consideration of the character and record of the 
individual . . . as a constitutionally indispensable part of the 
process of inflicting the penalty of death.”9  As will be seen, this 
mitigating circumstance evidentiary standard was often not met 
for juvenile death (and, later, near-death) sentenced individuals. 
Mitigating Evidence 
From the 1976 Furman decision to the turn of the twenty-
first century, the Court continued to reinforce and expand 
mitigating evidence requirements in capital cases.  The Court 
recognized that in order to support individualized sentencing 
requirements in capital cases the sentencing authority must be 
permitted to consider any aspect of a defendant’s character or 
record and any of the offense circumstances,10 and that troubled 
childhood histories must be considered a mitigating factor.11  
Subsequently, the Court found that jury instructions may not 
limit jury consideration of these mitigating circumstances, a 
significant step in having all parties be aware of the defendant’s 
background.12   
                                                 
7 Furman v. Georgia, 408, U.S. 238 (1972).  
8 Gregg v. Georgia, 428, U.S. 153 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
9 Woodson v. California, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976). The Court continued that 
“without this consideration, the possibility of compassionate or mitigating 
factors could not be reviewed in light of the frailties of humankind. Fixed 
death penalty sentencing guidelines treat human beings as members of a 
faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the 
penalty of death.”  
10 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
11 Eddings v. Oklahoma,436 U.S. 921 (1978). 
12 Hitchcock v. Dugger, 381 U.S. 393 (1987). 
  
The Court further found that the defendant’s character 
and background are relevant because of society’s belief that a 
disadvantaged upbringing, emotional difficulties, or mental 
problems may diminish offenders’ moral culpability.13  Indeed, 
the Court has posited that “[t]he sentence imposed at the death 
penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the 
defendant’s background, character, and crime”14 and must 
consider both the tangibles and intangibles of the defendant.15  
In some cases, evidence of drug abuse, brain damage, and 
poverty must be reviewed by the sentencing authority.16  And 
more recently, it was held unequivocal that evidence from 
childhood difficulties must be presented to the sentencing 
authority.17  The Court determined that the following evidence 
should be considered at sentencing of defendants: child 
borderline mental retardation, child physical abuse, parent 
imprisonment for child neglect, and reunification of the child 
with the abusive parent after prison release.  In addition, the 
Court faulted the absence of jury instructions informing the jury 
that it could consider and give effect to the defendant’s mental 
retardation and history of abuse.18  
It became clear doctrine that for a death sentence to be 
appropriately determined, the youthful offenders’ histories and 
difficulties must have been identified and presented to the 
sentencing authority.  Unfortunately, the failure to identify and 
review such childhood background, difficulties, traumas, and 
disabilities was common in capital cases.  Of the fifty-three 
juvenile offenders on death row in 2002, only twenty-six of the 
offenders’ background or mitigating histories were presented at 
trial, with five of the juries hearing only that the offender was an 
adolescent.19  Of these juvenile offender backgrounds not 
presented at trial, a majority had histories of traumatic abuse, 
                                                 
13 California v. Brown, 429 U.S. 538 (1987).  
14 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.  
15 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 427 U.S. 320 (1985). 
16 Hitchcock, 381 U.S. 393. 
17 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
18 Williams, 529 U.S. at 370-71. 
19 Mallett, supra note 2. 
  
 
mental health problems, school failure, and poverty.20  In a 
second review of twenty executed juveniles, similar outcomes 
were found in that nine had medically documented brain 
damage; however, only two of these adolescents’ jury trials were 
presented with this mitigating evidence (as seen in Table 1).21  
Table 1 – Juveniles Sentenced to Death 
Juveniles Sentenced to Death22 %  
Minority (African-American or Hispanic) 56 
Mitigating Histories  
Maltreatment victimization 68 
Poverty experienced 55 
Serious mental health disorders 37 
Developmentally delayed (mental 
retardation) 
31 
Substance abuse disorders 30 
School failure 28 
Brain damage 17 
 
Sentencing 
In two decisions, the Court narrowed the use of the death 
penalty and ultimately abolished its application to those less 
than eighteen years of age.  In Atkins v. Virginia, it was found 
that youthful offenders with low intellectual functioning could 
not be sentenced to death because their disabilities limited 
impulse control and judgment abilities, “[t]hey do not act with 
the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious 
adult criminal conduct.”23  The Court further reasoned that the 
use of this severe punishment neither afforded retribution for 
the offender’s act nor deterrence.24  This decision was important 
in providing serious youthful (and adult) offenders with 
                                                 
20 Mallett, supra note 2. 
21 See American Bar Association, Juvenile Death Penalty Report (2003).  
22 Mallett, supra note 2; American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Death 
Penalty Report (2000). 
23 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305 (2002). 
24 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311. 
  
 
significant developmental disabilities respite from the death 
penalty.  
And ultimately, in Roper, the Court found youthful 
offenders less culpable for similar impulse control reasons, 
among others, but went further to find adolescence itself a 
mitigating factor.25  This was not the first Court holding or 
commentary on juvenile offender culpability; early, the Court in 
Johnson v. Texas wrote, “the signature qualities of youth are 
transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and 
recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.”26  
Yet in Roper, the Court found relevant differences between those 
under eighteen years of age and adults so consequential as to not 
classify adolescents among the worst offenders.27  These 
differences included an underdeveloped sense of responsibility 
leading to impetuous actions as well as a lack of maturity,28 
lessened character development,29 and vulnerability to negative 
influences and outside peer pressure.30  For these reasons 
                                                 
25 Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (“The relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives 
from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals 
mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger 
years can subside.”). This was not the first Court holding or commentary on 
juvenile offender culpability, for in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 
(1988), it was acknowledged that “teenagers capacity for growth” and in 
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993), the Court stated “the signature 
qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and 
recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.”  
26 Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368. 
27 Roper, 543 U.S. at 556 (“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their 
identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime 
committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”). 
28 Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (“[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense 
of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more 
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous 
and ill-considered actions and decisions.”). 
29 Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (“[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as 
that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less 
fixed.”). 
30 Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time 
and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and 
to psychological damage. This is explained in part by the prevailing 
circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, 
over their own environment.”). 
  
“almost every State prohibits those under eighteen years of age 
from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental 
consent.”31  The juvenile death penalty was thus abolished; these 
individuals were resentenced to juvenile life without the 
possibility of parole. 
 This is not the end of the story.  Though executions of 
juvenile offenders are barred, the long-term and life-time 
incarceration of these similarly-situated serious youthful 
offenders is today’s quagmire.   
 
JUVENILE NEAR-DEATH PENALTY: 2005 TO PRESENT 
 A harsh, punitive paradigm continues to dominate the 
criminal justice system for serious youthful offenders, 
particularly those who have committed some of the more tragic 
offenses (murder, sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated assault); 
LWOP sentences are allowed for only aggravated murder or 
homicide in the states that utilize this punishment.  Though 
reform efforts, state budgetary difficulties, and litigation 
concerning unconstitutional care and dangerous facilities have 
reduced the number of youthful offender incarcerations over the 
past decade, little has changed for the subset of juveniles who 
have committed these serious personal crimes.  These youthful 
offenders are often incarcerated in juvenile and adult prisons, 
and for those who have committed murder, receive long 
incarceration sentences, and, for some, a life-time prison term.32    
Incarceration 
More than 60,000 youthful offenders are confined each 
day in the United States by order of a juvenile court.33  The most 
common placement for these committed adolescents is a locked, 
long-term state facility that typically hold hundreds of youthful 
offenders at one time, in prison-like environments with locked 
                                                 
31 Roper, 543 U.S. at 557.  
32 Supra note 3.  
33 Supra note 3.    
  
cell blocks, and provide minimal rehabilitative services.34  These 
incarcerations in juvenile justice facilities do not include 
youthful offenders transferred to the adult criminal courts, a 
controversial procedure that bifurcates the youthful offender 
population often without sufficient safeguards for the 
adolescent.35  While estimates vary, 2,500 to 10,000 youthful 
offenders are held in adult jails and prisons each day, in addition 
to the 60,000 in juvenile facilities.36  A majority of this 
incarcerated population is older (sixteen- and seventeen-year 
olds), male (87%), and minority (68%) adolescents.  Of the 
minority group, approximately 60% are African-American, 33% 
are Hispanic, and, depending on the jurisdiction, between 1-4% 
are American Indian or Asian,37 a phenomenon known as 
disproportionate minority confinement (DMC) and found in 
nearly all states (those formerly on death row were also 
disproportionately minority)38  Almost all youthful offenders 
sentenced to LWOP have detention, recidivism, and 
incarceration histories.   
Sentencing and Mitigating Evidence 
                                                 
34 Supra note 3. 
35 See Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border 
Disputes, 18 Future of Children 81 (2008); Simon Singer, Recriminalizing 
Delinquency: Violent Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice Reform (1996). 
36 See Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State 
Transfer Laws and Reporting, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Wash., 
D.C. (2011); State Trends: Legislative Victories from 2005 to 2010: Removing 
Youth from the Adult Criminal Justice System, Campaign for Youth Justice, 
Wash., D.C. (2011); Todd D. Minton, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear, 
Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S., Department of 
Justice, Wash., D.C. (2010).  
37 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, OJJDP Statistical 
Briefing Book (2011), available at 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/corrections/qa08201.asp?qaDate=2010; Paul 
Tracy et al., Gender Differences in Delinquency and Juvenile Justice 
Processing: Evidence from National Data, 55 Crime & Delinq. 171 (2009).  
38 See Alex R. Piquero, Disproportionate Minority Contact, 18 Future of 
Children 59 (2008); National Council on Crime and Delinquency, And Justice 
for Some: Differential Treatment of Youth of Color in the Justice System, 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Oakland, Cal. (2007). 
  
 
After Roper, the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment 
requires punishment to be proportioned to the youthful offender 
offense.39  A key factor in this proportionality determination is 
the culpability of the offender.40  Since 2005, two Court decisions 
have narrowed the available use of the most severe criminal 
punishments for serious youthful offenders, finding certain 
sentences violated the Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause.   
In Graham v. Florida, the Court found that sentencing non-
homicide offending youthful offenders to life without the 
possibility of parole was unconstitutional.  In so holding, the 
Court reinforced and relied upon their Roper decision in 
reiterating that youthful offenders are different from adults and 
that these characteristics mean that “[i]t is difficult even for 
expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.”41  The Court further found that 
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to 
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult 
minds.  For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior 
control continue to mature through late adolescence.”42  The 
Court decision, however, did not extend this Constitutional 
protection to youthful offenders sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole for homicide crimes.43   
 
 This constitutional protection from certain LWOP 
sentences for youthful offenders convicted of homicide was 
extended in Miller v. Alabama.  The Court furthered the reasoning 
from Roper and, more significantly from Graham, in finding that a 
youthful offender convicted of homicide and sentenced by a 
mandatory state statute to LWOP was unconstitutional.44  The 
                                                 
39 Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. 
40 Roper, 543 at 559-70; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; Ennund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 
797-801 (1982). 
41 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010). 
42 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
43 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. 
44 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
  
 
Court determined that these mandatory laws “run[] afoul of our 
cases’ requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants 
facing the most serious penalties.”45  The Court went further in 
addressing mitigating evidence in finding, “[m]andatory life 
without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his 
chronological age and its hallmark features – among them, 
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences.  It prevents taking into account the family and 
home environment that surrounds him – and from which he 
cannot usually extricate himself – no matter how brutal or 
dysfunctional.”46    
 
The law today allows the sentencing of youthful offenders 
convicted of homicide to LWOP, but only after the sentencing 
court has investigated and reviewed the adolescent’s mitigating 
evidence, involvement in the offense, and related matters.  
Specifically, a sentencing authority must consider the 
adolescent’s age and impact on maturity and appreciation of 
consequences, the family and home environment, the offense 
circumstances including involvement level and influence of 
peers, the adolescent’s level of sophistication in dealing with the 
adult criminal justice system, and the possibility for 
rehabilitation.  This mitigation investigation should be thorough 
and identify important developmental, family, maltreatment, 
mental health, and other related disability circumstances that the 
adolescent suffers or has suffered from, and in particular, those 
that impacted the commission of the crime.47 
  
Near-Death Sentenced Mitigating Histories 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller was a step 
forward in eliminating mandatory state LWOP sentences, yet 
this still allows the LWOP sentence after a review of mitigating 
and offense specific evidence.  The constitutional right granted 
in Miller may still not be guaranteed if important mitigating 
                                                 
45 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
46 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
47 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 24644. 
  
 
evidence is not uncovered and presented to the sentencing 
authority. 
This may be problematic because those in the population 
serving a LWOP sentence often have very difficult and traumatic 
mitigating histories, something not always readily identified.  In 
a review of 1,579 individuals serving these sentences in 2012, the 
following was found (though not all was presented to the earlier 
sentencing authority): 32% had been raised in public housing; 
and almost 20% were homeless, living with a friend, in a 
detention center, or a group home prior to incarceration; nearly 
half (47%) experienced physical abuse, including almost 80% of 
females; 21% were victims of sexual abuse, including 77% of 
females; 40% had been enrolled in special education classes; 84% 
had been suspended or expelled from school, including 53% that 
were not enrolled in school at the time of the crime.48 
 The incarcerated serious youthful offender population 
(most not serving life sentences, and in either long-term juvenile 
or adult facilities) have similar mitigating histories and 
difficulties.  In fact, most suffer disproportionately from 
educational deficits and related learning problems, mental 
health/substance abuse disorders, and/or maltreatment 
victimizations.49  The prevalence rates of these mitigating 
difficulties in the incarcerated serious youthful offending 
population can be quite astounding.  Reviews of this population 
over the past two decades have found significantly higher 
incidences of these disorders and maltreatment victimizations – 
from two (for some mental health disorders) to as many as sixty 
                                                 
48 Nellis, supra note 4.  
49 See John H. Lemmon, How Child Maltreatment Affects Dimensions of 
Juvenile Delinquency in a Cohort of Low-Income Urban Males 16 Just. Q. 357 
(2009); Ilhong Yun et al., Disentangling the Relationship Between Child 
Maltreatment and Violent Delinquency: Using a Nationally Representative 
Sample, 26 J. Interpersonal Violence 88 (2011); Christopher A. Mallett, Seven 
Things Juvenile Courts Should Know About Learning Disabilities, National 
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Reno, Nev. (2011); Christopher 
A. Mallett et al., Predicting Juvenile Delinquency: The Nexus of Child 
Maltreatment, Depression, and Bipolar Disorder, 19 Crim. Behav. & Mental 
Health 235 (2009).   
  
 
times (for maltreatment victimization) the rates found in the 
general adolescent population (see Table 2).50   









Minority (African-American or 
Hispanic) 
68 36 
Life Histories   
Maltreatment victimization 34-60 1 
Special education disabilities  28-45 4-9 
Mental health disorders 35-80 9-18 
Substance abuse  30-70 4-5 
 
 These difficulties are often linked to the offending 
behaviors.  Maltreatment victimization and related trauma 
experiences are not only harmful to adolescents, but for many 
lead to serious offending behavior risks – including school 
difficulties, mental health disorders, and substance abuse 
problems.51  Adolescents with maltreatment histories who do 
                                                 
50 See Laurie Chassin, Juvenile Justice and Substance Abuse, 18 Future of 
Children 165 (2008); Daniel P. Mears & Laudan Y. Aron, Addressing the 
Needs of Youth with Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System: The Current 
State of Knowledge, Urban Institute, Justice Policy Center, Wash., D.C. (2003); 
Linda Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders of Youth in Detention, Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Wash., D.C. (2006); Jason J. Washburn et al., 
Psychiatric Disorders Among Detained Youths: A Comparison of Youths 
Processed in Juvenile Court and Adult Criminal Court, 59 Psychiatric Services 
965 (2008).  
51 See J. David Hawkins et al., Predictors of Youth Violence, Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Wash., D.C. (2000); Heather A. Turner et al., The Effect 
of Lifetime Victimization on the Mental Health of Children and Adolescents, 
62 Soc. Sci. & Med. 13 (2006); Jeffrey Leiter, School Performance Trajectories 
After the Advent of Reported Maltreatment, 29 Children & Youth Services 
Rev. 363 (2007). 
  
not complete high school, those in foster care who are truant or 
change schools often, and those aging out of the child welfare 
system are at high risk for incarceration.52   
Mental health problems are often severe within the 
incarcerated youthful offender population: psychotic, mood, and 
post-traumatic stress disorders are common.53  Of particular 
concern is a subset of these troubled adolescents (between 5-10% 
of those with a mental health diagnosis) who develop serious 
emotional disturbances that substantially impact functioning.54  
Those in this group have long histories of multiple mental health 
disorders and related problems (often substance abuse and 
trauma) that continue into young adulthood, and constitute 20% 
of incarcerated youthful offenders in most states.55  Experiencing 
these traumas and difficulties – in particular, poor parenting, 
abuse and neglect, and severe mental health problems (including 
psychopathic traits) – are predictors of adolescent violence and, 
for some, homicide.56 
                                                 
52 See Joseph P. Ryan et al., Maltreatment and Delinquency: Investigating 
Child Welfare Bias in Juvenile Justice Processing, 29 Children & Youth 
Services Rev. 1035 (2007). 
53 See Robert Kinscherff, A Primer for Mental Health Practitioners Working 
with Youth Involved in the Juvenile Justice System, Technical Assistance 
Partnership for Child and Family Mental Health, Wash., D.C. (2012); Jennifer 
Wareham & Denise Paquette Boots, The Link Between Mental Health 
Problems and Youth Violence in Adolescence, 39 Crim. Just. & Behav. 1002 
(2012).  
54 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Mental 
Health, United States, 2008, Center for Mental Health Services, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Wash., D.C. (2008). 
55 See John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Juvenile Justice and 
Mental Health: A Collaborative Approach, Models for Change: Systems 
Reform in Juvenile Justice, Chicago, Ill. (2012); Joseph J. Cocozza & Kathleen 
Skowyra, Youth with Mental Health Disorders: Issues and Emerging 
Responses, 7 Juvenile Just. J. 3 (2000).  
56 See Kathleen Heide, Young Killers: The Challenge of Juvenile Homicide 
(1999); Matt DeLisi & Glen Walters, Multiple Homicide as a Function of 
Prisonization and Concurrent Instrumental Violence: Testing an Interaction 
Model – Research Note, 47 Crime & Delinq. 147 (2011); Alex Piquero, John 
MacDonald et al., Self-Control, Violent Offending, and Homicide 
Victimization: Assessing the General Theory of Crime, 21 J. Quantitative 
Criminology 55 (2005). 
  
 
ROPER AND ABOLISHMENT: DEATH PROBLEM REDEFINED 
LWOP’s Disproportionate Impact 
The LWOP sentence is much more widely available than 
the former juvenile death penalty sentence.  There are between 
1,755 and 2,574 serious youthful offenders currently serving a 
LWOP sentence in thirty-four states,57 representing a majority of 
states that allow this sentence.58  By comparison, in 2005, only 
seventy-one serious youthful offenders were on death row.  In 
addition, from 1973 to 2005, only twenty-five states allowed this 
death sentencing, while most states did not ever sentence a 
juvenile to death row (see Table 3).59        
Table 3 – Death Penalty and LWOP Sentencing Comparison 
Juvenile Death Penalty Sentencing  
(1973-2005) 
 
Juvenile LWOP Sentencing 
22 Executions (226 ever sentenced)60 2,524 Serving LWOP in 201261 
                                                 
57 See Christopher A. Mallett, Juvenile Life Without the Possibility of Parole, 
35 Children & Youth Services Rev. 743 (2013). 
58 See Ashley Nellis & Ryan S. King, No Exit: The Expanding Use of Life 
Sentences in America, The Sentencing Project (2009). There is some 
controversy in identifying the exact number of LWOP-sentenced youthful 
offenders because of different definitions utilized: some researchers use an 
expanded “juvenile” definition of all offenders under the age of eighteen, not 
just those based on state law definitions (whereby some sixteen-and 
seventeen-year-olds when transferred to adult criminal court are no longer 
counted as juveniles), and find the higher prevalence rates. See Human Rights 
Watch, State Distribution of Estimated 2,574 Juvenile Offenders Serving 
Juvenile Life without Parole (Rest of their Lives 2009 Update), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenile-
offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole); Paulo G. Annino et al., 
Juvenile Life without Parole for Non-Homicide Offenses: Florida Compared 
to Nation, Public Interest Law Center, Fla. St. U. (2009).  
59 Streib, supra note 6. 
60 Streib, supra note 6. 
61 The most recent data on the number of youthful offenders serving a LWOP 
sentence (as of November 2012) is from the University of San Francisco’s 




Texas (13) Texas (4) 
Florida Florida (266) 
Alabama Alabama (62) 
Louisiana (1) Louisiana (355) 
Mississippi Mississippi (24) 
Georgia (1) Washington (28) 
North Carolina North Carolina (44) 
Arizona Arizona (32) 
Oklahoma (2) Oklahoma (49) 
South Carolina (1) South Carolina (26) 
Pennsylvania Pennsylvania (444) 
Ohio Ohio (2) 
Virginia (3) Virginia (56) 
Missouri (1) Missouri (116) 
Indiana Delaware (7) 
Kentucky Arizona (32) 
Maryland Maryland (13) 
Nevada Nevada (21) 
Arizona Total = 1,582 
Delaware  
New Jersey Juvenile Death Penalty was not Available; LWOP is 
Available 
Washington Illinois (103) 
Arkansas Massachusetts (57) 
Idaho Nebraska (24) 
Utah South Dakota (9) 
 California (250) 
 Hawaii (4) 
 Idaho (4) 
 New Hampshire (3) 
 North Dakota (1) 
 Tennessee (4) 
 Arkansas (73) 
 Iowa (44) 
 Michigan (346) 
 Minnesota (2) 
 Rhode Island (2) 
 Connecticut (9) 
  
 Delaware (7) 
 Total = 942 
 
It is worth reinforcing that there are ten times as many 
youthful offenders serving a LWOP sentence today than were 
ever sentenced to death between 1976 and 2005.  In eighteen  
states that allow a LWOP sentence, and that also allowed past 
juvenile death penalty sentences, there are 1,582 youthful 
offenders imprisoned for life.  Additionally, in the seventeen 
states that did not allow a past juvenile death penalty sentence 
there are 942 youthful offenders currently imprisoned for life.  
While these numbers may decrease with the impact of the Miller 
decision, the LWOP sentence continues to be utilized across a 
majority of states, with a disproportionate impact in a few states 
(Florida, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, California, and Michigan), 
similar to the juvenile death penalty sentencing era and its 
disproportionate usage in a few states (Texas, Virginia, and 
Louisiana).  However, it is also quite possible that these LWOP 
sentencing levels may continue indefinitely for there is no 
current Supreme Court case scheduled to review or further the 
Miller decision, though a number of advocates may pursue this 
in certain federal district courts.62        
Not only are LWOP sentences more widely available and 
utilized than the former juvenile death penalty sentence, its 
outcome equally hopeless.  When an adolescent is sentenced 
without even the possibility of a parole hearing in future 
decades, this is a near-death experience: no options, no 
rehabilitation, and nothing will change this future.  
Unfortunately, the incarceration experience itself, beyond this 
lack of hope for redemption, harms the youthful offender.  Time 
spent in these facilities gravely impacts adolescent development 
and decreases cognitive and social functioning.  A majority of 
the LWOP sentenced population is sixteen or seventeen years 
old, and adolescents of this age have deficiencies in decision-
                                                 
62 In particular, the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, Alabama, the 
group responsible for shepherding the Miller case through the federal courts 
to the Supreme Court. 
  
making ability, greater vulnerability to external coercion, and an 
underdeveloped character.63  Incarceration also significantly 
lessens adolescents’ abilities to function independently because 
of the rigid expectations of the facility, and social and coping 
skills are diminished for similar reasons.64  Incarceration 
facilities lack necessary rehabilitation services, separate the 
adolescents from their families, and are often dangerous and 
violent environments.65 
Social Quagmire 
One of the most disturbing realities of youthful offenders 
who were formerly sentenced to death and today are imprisoned 
for life is that most had such traumatized and difficult 
backgrounds.  Most did not make it unscathed into young 
adulthood because of gravely harmful experiences, including 
poverty, highly dysfunctional families, school and learning 
failures, severe mental health problems, and for most, a 
comorbid impact of multiple difficulties.  Delinquency, 
detention, and incarceration are often the outcomes for these 
adolescent difficulties. 
However, there is more to this unhappy ending: social 
and political factors also impact the pathway to incarceration 
and, for some, a life prison term.  As discussed earlier, a 
disproportionate number of the LWOP-sentenced youthful 
offenders are minority (African-American, Hispanic, and 
depending on the jurisdiction, American Indian or Asian), with a 
concentration of these sentences occurring in a fairly small 
number of states (Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, 
Illinois, California, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Oklahoma, and 
                                                 
63 See Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the 
Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 Future of Children 16 (2008); Laurence 
Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, 58 Am. 
Psychologist 1009 (2003).  
64 See Julia Dmitrieva et al., Arrested Development: The Effects of 
Incarceration on the Development of Psychosocial Maturity, 24 Dev. & 
Psychopathology 1073 (2012). 
65 Supra note 3. 
  
 
Massachusetts).66  In a recent study of LWOP sentences across all 
states, it was found that race and the election of judges had 
significant impacts on outcomes.  States that have the most 
African-Americans and have judges that are elected (and not 
appointed) sentence the most youthful offenders to life terms in 
prison; in other words, more politically conservative states 
disproportionately sentence minorities to LWOP sentences. 
Abolish LWOP 
LWOP sentences are near-death experiences for the 
youthful offender, similar to the abolished juvenile death 
penalty.  These sentences impact a far greater number of 
adolescents across most states and are influenced by racial 
politics and other nefarious factors.  A majority of those who are 
LWOP-sentenced are poor, minority, and troubled young 
people.  For these and other related reasons, the Supreme Court 
should determine that a juvenile LWOP sentence is cruel and 
unusual punishment and hold it to be unconstitutional.  A 
society is not judged by the success of its most able-bodied but 






                                                 
66 In late 2012 a federal court in Michigan ordered the review of all LWOP-
sentenced youthful offenders based on the Miller decision. In addition, in 
nearly a dozen states, their respective Supreme Courts are revisiting the 
sentences of many currently LWOP-sentenced youthful offenders, based on 
the Miller decision; however, it is not clear whether Miller can be applied 
retroactively. Moving forward, though, there is some positive news for 
youthful offenders and these severe sentences: California, Delaware, and 
Wyoming eliminated LWOP sentences; and Arkansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah have placed greater 
restrictions on the use of LWOP.  However, mandatory minimum legislation 
was defeated in Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, and Washington. 
